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Abstract 
Where do government officials allocate infrastructure resources when there are margins 
for personal discretion? In a panel of 276 Chinese cities with observations from 1993 to 2009, I 
examine the relationship between the birthplaces of government officials and the area of paved 
roads built in each respective city. I find that on average, the area of paved roads in cities that are 
also the birthplaces of high-level officials increases as the number of high-level officials and the 
number of years during which they stay in office increase. This phenomenon is especially 
significant after China decentralized its fiscal process in 2004 and it provides support for the 
proposed theoretical framework where local officials build roads in high-level officials’ 
hometowns in hopes of receiving promotion. This study contributes to the few works in the 
economics literature that examines distributive politics in an autocratic state. 
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I. Introduction 
One of the biggest dangers of corruption, as evident in economics literature, is it produces 
inefficient market outcomes (Mauro 1995, 1997, Rose-Ackerman 1997, Bó & Rossi 2007). 
Economic inefficiency can occur when government officials offer undue benefits to companies 
that offer monetary or non-monetary bribes and kickbacks, resulting in a sub-optimal allocation 
of resources. Where winners are not decided based on competition, this leads to lower quality 
products and higher costs of production (Bai & Qian 2010). The inefficient allocation of 
resources can have a geographical dimension as well. Political pressures and informal personal 
influences can result in regional favoritism, skewing the geographical distribution of public 
resources to areas that yield greater political benefits than economic efficiency. In democratic 
governments, this process is commonly understood as pork-barrel politics where government 
officials provide selective benefits to their constituents in order to garner votes. Intuitively, 
authoritarian regimes, though they lack democratic electoral processes, should observe a similar 
yet even stronger effect of skewed public resource distribution as a result of inadequate checks 
and balances within the political system (Hodler & Raschky 2014). This paper examines the 
presence of regional favoritism in an autocratic regime — China — focusing specifically on the 
geographical distribution of paved roads as determined by the birthplaces of powerful 
governmental officials. 
China provides a timely case study during a period when the country’s problems with 
corruption are under scrutiny by both domestic and international audiences. President Xi 
Jinping’s rise to power in late 2012 ushered in an extensive anti-corruption campaign against 
both high and low ranks of the Chinese Communist Party, drawing attention to the severity of 
corruption in the country and its far-reaching impact on all areas of the Chinese society. In 
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China, corruption is especially rampant in sectors like transportation where large-scale 
infrastructure projects allow funds to be maneuvered around more easily. Inefficient allocation of 
resources impedes China’s economic growth and lowers the rate of returns on infrastructure 
investment (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). In a country where infrastructure investment composes 
around ten percent of its annual economic output, corruption poses a significant threat to the 
domestic economy (Dobbs et al. 2013). 
Surprisingly, little empirical work has been conducted evaluating the impact of 
corruption in China’s infrastructure investment. This is in part due to the hidden nature of the 
corruption and the lack of effective tools of measurement and evaluation (Guo 2008). The 
disadvantage of not having trustworthy data and effective tools to measure corruption means that 
researchers need to develop other proxies of measurement for corruption, as some have already 
done in recent studies (Hite 2006; Golden & Picci 2005; Hodler & Raschky 2014). While 
corruption is traditionally defined in the economics literature as the misuse of public office for 
private gains (Treisman 1998), this study adopts Do et al.’s definition (2013) of corruption as 
favoritism toward certain associated groups, offering a different lens through which one could 
understand corruption. By evaluating the geographical distribution of resources across a 
particular country, researchers may be able to detect the manifestation of corruption through 
regional favoritism. In an authoritarian regime like China, government officials at the village 
level or above are selected through a top-down process. This implies that instead of providing 
benefits to the people for the sake of garnering votes in democratic regimes, officials need to 
secure favor from higher-level officials by delivering satisfactory economic performance and 
through political actions. Given the dynamics of elite selection as discussed above, the key 
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question of this study is as follows: can one observe corruption, in the form of regional 
favoritism, in the distribution of public resources in China?  
This paper answers the question by examining the impact of high-level government 
officials on the geographical distribution of public infrastructure to their hometowns in China. 
More specifically, it uses panel data to explore variation across different prefectural-level cities 
in China from 1993 to 2009. I focus on the geographical distribution of paved roads in particular, 
controlling for factors that may influence the area of paved roads in the city such as the size of 
the population, the size of the city, and the overall income level of the city. I hypothesize that the 
top-down selection process of government officials implies that lower-level officials take on the 
preferences of their superiors and direct their resources in ways that will benefit their superiors 
or those who got them in power. To increase his or her chance for promotion and obtain favor 
from his superior, the lower-level official will build more roads in the birthplaces of the national-
level officials. I find that on average, high-level government officials in China do have a positive 
effect on the area of paved roads in their hometowns, even after controlling for time-invariant 
prefectural-level city characteristics through fixed effects. In addition, I find that the prevalence 
of hometown favoritism increases as the officials’ years in office increase.  
This study is the first of its kind to explore the relationship between the geographical 
distribution of roads and the birthplaces of government officials in China. Using career data on 
government officials as a proxy to measure corruption, it provides is an innovative way to study 
corruption in autocratic countries like China where reliable data is difficult to obtain. The same 
proxy can then be modified and expanded to evaluate the effect of regional favoritism on other 
types of infrastructure and in other autocratic states. Indeed, while there are many studies done in 
the field of political economy on distributive politics in democratic regimes, few empirical 
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research studies look at the same phenomenon in authoritarian regimes (Golden & Min 2013). 
My work contributes to the general strand of literature on distributive politics and more 
importantly, the sub-strand that focuses on distributive politics in autocratic states.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a brief overview of 
related literature on corruption in China and distributive politics. Section III describes the 
background of public office selection and promotion and infrastructure investment in China. 
Section IV develops the theoretical framework behind this study by borrowing core concepts 
from Do et al.’s study on distributive politics. Section V and VI present the empirical framework 
and the data that I use for this paper. Section VII provides a discussion of the findings and 
Section VIII, the conclusion.  
II. Related Literature 
Corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of public office for private gain (Treisman 
1998). In this paper, I follow Do et al. (2013)’s specification and define corruption as favoritism 
toward certain associated groups, and in my case, toward certain regions. Favoritism can be 
defined as a form of corruption because it is a manifestation of government officials’ abuse of 
power in public office for private gains. These officials are elected for the purpose of providing 
public goods, and favoritism creates an uneven distribution of these goods on the basis of 
personal discretion. The prevalence of corruption in China is a well-known challenge, but there 
does not exist a sufficient amount of empirical research dedicated to the topic to help readers 
better understand how corruption affects the government’s provision of public goods. The 
current literature pertaining to this topic falls into two broad categories: 1) corruption’s impact 
on efficiency and growth, and 2) the impact of political leaders in affecting the allocation of 
resources.  
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A. Corruption 
Scholars have addressed corruption’s impact on growth and its effect on the composition of 
public expenditures (Mauro 1995; Mauro 1998). In one of the seminal pieces of literature on 
corruption, Paolo Mauro (1995) found a significant negative relationship between corruption and 
growth rates across a host of countries. Mauro also found that corruption, which he defines as the 
degree to which business transactions involve questionable payments, not only lowers growth 
rates but it also lowers private investment. Cole et al’s study that analyzes the distribution of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in China found that FDI is attracted to provinces with higher 
level of government efficiency and are actively involved in the fight against corruption (Cole et 
al. 2008, 1494). Further, corruption is widely understood to be more prevalent in the 
infrastructure sector (Wade 1982, Rose-Ackerman 1996). It can reduce growth by increasing 
unproductive public investment that yields low returns (Devarajan et al. 1996, Tanzi and 
Davoodi 1997) and reduce the quality of infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).  
As I discussed briefly in the introduction section and as evident through these studies, the 
perception of high-level corruption in China has significant impact on all levels of economic 
activity and may be detrimental to the growth of the Chinese economy. In a country where 
economic growth provides the legitimacy of the ruling party, corruption in China is highly 
destabilizing to both its economic and political systems. The problem may manifest itself 
through many channels, i.e. bribery, embezzlement and etc., but less well known are the informal 
influences that create the same economic inefficiencies. This study contributes to an expanded 
understanding of corruption and specifically explores the effect of political leaders on the 
unequal distribution of resources. 
B. Distributive Politics and Regional Favoritism 
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Harold Laswell (1936) infamously wrote that politics is about “who gets what, when, how;” it is 
the authoritative allocation of resources (Su & Yang 2000). In democratic regimes, government 
officials are responsible to their constituents. They are assumed to be office seeking and their 
performance is evaluated by domestic constituents who have the ability to take the officials out 
of office. Pork-barrel politics (Ferejohn 1974), the practice of allocating greater number of 
resources to domestic constituents in order to secure votes of gain reelection, is a widespread 
practice in the United States and in other democracies. Albouy (2009) finds that states 
represented by members of Congress in the majority party receive greater federal grants, 
especially in transportation and defense spending. Alternatively, Berry et al. (2010) posit that the 
president is the one who has the authority to decide where to allocate federal funds. They found 
that districts and counties receive significantly more funding when their representing members of 
Congress belong to the same party as the president. While the studies discover differing results, 
they show that powerful government officials do affect the ways in which federal funds are 
geographically distributed. 
In Mauro’s study on corruption and its effect on growth rates that I mentioned in the 
previous section, Mauro uses the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index (ELF) as an instrumental 
variable to correct for the endogeneity bias between corruption and growth rates. Through that he 
found a strong correlation between the ELF index and corruption, which he explains the reason 
may be due to bureaucrats’ favoritism toward their own ethnic group. His finding contributes to a 
growing strand of literature that finds favoritism on the basis of ethnicity (Posner 2005, Kramon 
and Posner 2013, Franck and Rainer 2012). While my study does not examine the impact of 
ethnicity on the allocation of public resources, these studies focusing on ethnicity uncover the 
issue of favoritism in federal resource allocation and provide motivation for my study. Indeed, 
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Hodler and Raschky (2014)’s research looked at the light intensities of political leaders’ 
hometowns in all countries with more than half a million inhabitants and found them to be 
significantly more than the light intensities of regions that are not also the hometowns of political 
leaders. They conclude that regional favoritism is a widespread phenomenon that is more 
prevalent in autocratic countries.  
In autocratic countries, domestic constituents do not elect officials into office. Instead, 
officials gain support from their superiors who have the power to elect them into office (Do et al. 
2013). In China, economic achievements are used to impress superiors in hopes of being 
rewarded with promotion. How does this elite selection dynamic affect distributive politics in 
autocratic regimes? Little empirical research have been done on this topic, but the only one and 
possibly the closest study to my paper looks at hometown favoritism in Vietnam (Do et al. 2014). 
The authors found that differing levels of government officials are able to influence the budget 
allocation process once promoted and greater levels of infrastructure are observed in their 
hometowns. My results are consistent to that of Do et al’s, but my paper differs by showing an 
increasing impact of high-level officials on public resource allocation over time, not simply after 
promotion to higher-level office. My paper contributes to the void in the economics literature on 
distributive politics in autocratic countries and focuses on the case study of China. In the next 
section, I briefly describe the basic mechanisms of political selection and the fiscal process in 
China before I introduce my theoretical framework.   
III. Background on China 
A. Political Selection in China 
That political promotion is largely associated with economic growth is a perspective widely held 
by scholars who study political mobility in China (Chen et al. 2005, Bo 1996, Maskin et al 
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2000). Jia et al. (2015) also shows that a politician’s connections with top leaders in the Chinese 
Communist Party also increase the chances of promotion. More formally, however, the selection 
of officials in China is determined based on the nomenklatura system: 
The nomenklatura…consists of lists of leading positions over which party units exercise the 
power of appointment and dismissal, lists of reserve candidates for those positions, and rules 
governing the actual processes of appointments and dismissals… Through this vehicle the 
party monopolizes the power to determine who will join — and who will be forced out of — 
the country’s elite in all spheres (Lieberthal 1995, 209). 
Since 1984, the Party has practiced the “one rank down” appointment where an official’s 
chances of promotion were almost entirely dependent on the support of his immediate superior. 
This, in turn, has increased the possibility of local despotism (Lieberthal 1995, 212). The 
immense promotional power given to each official’s superior would also create incentives for 
corrupted practices among the all ranks of the political system in order to gain upward political 
mobility.  
B. Chinese Fiscal Process 
The budgetary process was highly centralized in China until the onset of market reforms in the 
1970s. The hierarchy of the Chinese political system starts at the top with national, to provincial, 
prefectural, county and finally township-level. Because of fiscal decline in China, the 
responsibility to provide public services and infrastructure has fallen onto the shoulders of sub-
national governments, most notably the prefectural-level. Aside from simply financing these 
services and projects through extra-budgetary funds, however, local governments gained new 
authority to make investment decisions. A critical public investment management reform came 
in 2004 where one of the key policies within the reform was to simplify approval procedures. 
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“The cessation of administrative approval over non-public investment was widely interpreted by 
subnational governments to mean that only projects funded by the budget were required to go 
through the institutional framework. The vast majority of public investment was considered 
“exempted” from 2004 onward (Wong 2014, 16).” Because of the devolution of China’s 
budgetary process, local officials have a greater amount of authority in making decisions on 
infrastructure.	 
Guo (2009) argues that local Chinese officials both have the incentives and the capacity 
to influence local budgets. Related to the political selection process in China, local officials often 
build large-scale development projects that are highly visible and quantifiable, like roads, 
highways, and other large infrastructure projects in order to impress their superiors. They are 
able to do so as a result of the decentralization of budgetary control. Chinese local officials 
nowadays assume “an unprecedented large proportion of government spending responsibilities 
and day-to-day control over various economic activities (Guo 2009, 625).” As a result of local 
governments’ increased autonomy, while the Central Government continues to outline goals for 
infrastructure development every five years through the Five-Year Plans, local government 
officials are able to exercise discretion over where roads are built as long as they reach the 
identified goals. 
IV. Theoretical Framework 
As I have mentioned above, unlike bottom-up electoral politics, Chinese local officials 
seek support from their superiors. For example, provincial officials who are vying for seats in the 
Central Committee will want to not only deliver high economic outcomes but also seek to gain 
support by acting in the favor of the national-level officials who are already members in the 
Central Committee.  
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Local-level government officials, as the primary economic agents, are defined in this 
study as officials at the prefectural level. It is based on the assumption that officials at lower-
levels will always seek to impress their superiors at the next level higher because of the “one 
rank down” practice of political appointment. To illustrate, a village level official will seek to 
impress a county level official, who is trying to impress a prefectural level official. Because of 
these layers of political pleasing, lower-level officials can be considered to have similar 
preferences as they eventually align with the preferences of national-level officials.  
Local level officials face a decision to allocate roads to the birthplaces of national level 
officials as opposed to otherwise. The reasoning is that a local official can secure the national-
level official’s favor by allocating the local government’s budget for roads to the hometown of a 
national-level official. It is based on the assumption that better infrastructure yields greater social 
utility for a city. Since a national official will have an existing social network in his birthplace, 
the local official may want to influence the allocation of infrastructure to benefit the national 
official’s social network in order to obtain favor from him/her, increasing his chances of 
promotion.  
Local officials benefit from allocating roads to the national-level officials’ hometowns 
because by building roads in the hometowns of national-level officials, these local officials gain 
favor from the national-level officials and increase their chance of promotion within the Party 
system. The assumption is that the Chinese political system is similar to a single internal labor 
market without outside options and officials have great incentive to remain in office (Li and 
Zhou 2004). 
While local officials have sufficient amount of control in deciding day-to-day economic 
activities, they are still subjected to budgetary constraints that are allocated to each province, 
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prefecture, county, township, and village. While infrastructure can also be funded by 
international organizations’ loans and foreign capital (Démurger 2000), these other sources of 
funding remain a small portion of total funding (Bai & Qian 2009). Thus, local officials do not 
have an indefinite amount of resources to spend on allocating roads to national officials’ 
birthplaces, which creates a scenario where the local officials have to determine the costs and 
benefits and allocate an amount based on his expected benefits.   
Therefore, a local level official is modeled in a simple two-period discounted utility as 
follows: 𝑉! = 𝑢! + β Ε 𝑢!  = 𝑢! + β(𝑃𝑢! + 1− 𝑃 𝑢!);                (a) 
where β is a positive constant 
The total utility of a local official, with respect to roads, is the utility that he receives in 
the current period as a local official (𝑢!) plus the utility that he expects to get in the second 
period Ε 𝑢!  at a discounted rate (β). The utility that a local official gets in the second period is 
dependent on the probability (P) that he gets promoted. In a simplistic world where there are 
only two goods, the official can decide to use his budget (𝐵) on either allocating roads to a 
higher-level official’s birthplace (𝑐𝑅) or on anything else that he personally prefers. Since 
building roads in a higher-level official’s birthplace does not directly benefit himself, these roads 
are modeled as a total cost (𝑐𝑅) out of his budget 𝐵, where 𝑐 is the per unit cost of roads. His 
utility in the current period is therefore a function of1: 
 																																																								
1 𝑢! can be reasonably assumed to remain the same in the next period, where the official spends 𝑐𝑅 on roads 
allocation, for two reasons: 1) the financing of infrastructure projects is assumed to take more than one period, and 
2) local officials who were not promoted in one period as a result of roads allocation in higher-level officials’ 
hometowns may choose to do so again. The retry process is not explicitly modeled here in this paper.   
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𝑢! =  𝑓(𝐵, 𝑐𝑅) ;           (b) 
where 𝐵 and 𝑐 are positive constants and 𝑢!! (𝑅) < 0 
 Further, in this simple scenario, the probability of promotion can be written as a function 
of the cost of roads and the local official’s budget. This time, however, the amount of money that 
the local official allocates to building roads in a high-level official’s birthplace (𝑐𝑅) out of his 
budget 𝐵 increases his chance for promotion: P =  𝑔(𝐵, 𝑐𝑅) ;        (c) 
where 𝐵 and 𝑐 are positive constants and P′(𝑅) > 0 
Substituting these two functions into 𝑢! and P, the local official’s total utility becomes: 𝑉! = 𝑢! + β(𝑃𝑢! + 1− 𝑃 𝑢!)        = 𝑓(𝐵, 𝑐𝑅)+ β(𝑔(𝐵, 𝑐𝑅)𝑢! + 1− 𝑔(𝐵, 𝑐𝑅) 𝑓(𝐵, 𝑐𝑅));       (d) 
where 𝑓 is a decreasing function and g is an increasing function 
Maximizing this function with respect to 𝑅 yields a unique solution for the optimal 
amount of roads that would be allocated in higher-level official’s birthplace. The tradeoff is that 
building more roads in a higher-level official’s birthplace decreases the local official’s utility in 
the current period but increases his chances for promotion and therefore his expected utility in 
the next period. As such, the more a local official cares about being promoted, the bigger share 
of the budget he would allocate to building roads in a higher-official’s hometown.  
Based on this theoretical framework, I posit that: 
H1: To maximize one’s chances for promotion, a local official who has budgetary control 
will build more roads in the cities that are also the birthplaces of high-level government officials 
as opposed to otherwise, ceteris paribus. 
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H2: The area of paved roads will increase as the number of high-level officials increases 
in cities that are also the birthplaces of high-level government officials, ceteris paribus. 
V. Data 
This study utilizes a panel dataset that draws from data on officials’ career and data on 
China’s annual statistics from 1993 to 2009 with prefecture-level cities as the unit of 
observation.  
A. China’s Annual Statistics 
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBR) publishes the China Statistical Yearbooks (CSYB), 
which includes data on GDP, population, the area of land, and the area of paved roads in each 
prefecture-level city in each year. I use the same dataset as Alder et al (2015)’s study on the 
impact of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) on economic development in China. The main unit of 
analysis is the urban core of a prefecture-level city, a sub-provincial administrative level in 
China. A prefecture-level city includes the urban core, which can be understood as a city in the 
traditional sense, and a larger surrounding area that may include smaller cities, towns, or 
villages. The reasoning for using the urban core of each prefecture-level city as the unit of 
analysis is due to the lack of the paved roads measurement at the level of urban area. Thus, 
trading a more comprehensive look at the cities for the sake of consistency, I use urban core as 
the unit for each of the variables. Within the dataset, there are altogether 276 prefecture-level 
cities, which I call cities from this point forward for simplicity sake. I exclude non-Han cities as 
well as Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin from this study because of the lack of available 
information in the dataset. Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are also special cases that 
may skew the results of the study because of their designations as province-level municipalities. 
Another shortfall of the dataset is that it is missing data from 1995 and 1996. However, despite 
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the missing data for those two years, there remains 15 years of observations for most of the 
cities, which will be sufficient for the purpose of this research study.  
 Although there are reasons to question the reliability of the data from China Statistical 
Yearbooks, there are no clear alternatives for other sources of data that I could retrieve. Since I 
am analyzing data on a large number of cities, I assume that if data were unreliable or inflated, 
they would be normalized across all cities. 
B. Career Data 
The other major data source on officials’ career data comes from China Vitae, a non-profit 
organization based in Maryland, United States that was founded in 2001 to collect information 
on China’s top leadership. The organization runs a website that provides career information of 
Chinese government officials to the public. I use the dataset that Jia et al. (2015) constructed 
from China Vitae in their study on the impact of social networks on political selection in China. 
The dataset includes all of the provincial governors, provincial secretaries, and politburo 
members who have held office for at least twelve months in between June 1993 and June 2009. 
A total of 187 officials whose curriculum vitaes were found on China Vitae are included and 
they are the high-level officials to whom I refer in this study. These CVs include the official’s 
name, province of birth, year of birth, and the important positions that they held. Additionally, I 
obtained the corresponding birthplaces for each of the 187 officials from China Vitae. Because many 
of officials’ birthplaces were listed at an administrative level lower than the prefecture-level, I then 
matched the birthplaces with corresponding prefectural-level cities.  
C. Key Independent Variable: Official 
In order to evaluate the impact of officials on the area of paved roads in each city across 17 years, I 
combined the two datasets into one panel dataset grouped by prefecture-level cities. I constructed the 
official variable based on the career dataset that I had in hand and merged it onto the CSYB dataset. I 
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first took a count of the number of officials who were provincial secretaries, provincial governors, or 
politburo members in each year by each prefecture. Then I took the cumulative sum of the number of 
national officials from 1993 to 2009. To illustrate, if there were two officials in office in Ankang in 
1993 and three officials in office in the same city 1994, the value under the official variable in 1994 
is the cumulative sum of officials from 1993 and 1994, which equals to 5 officials. The formal 
definition of the official variable is as follows: 
 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙!,! =  𝐼𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒!,!!""#! !  ;      (e) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒!,! represents the current number of officials who were born in city i and are 
in office at time t-n, where n represents the total number of years since 1993. The 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙!,! variable 
represents the cumulative number of official-years who were born in city i and their total years in 
office in time t. The logic for taking the cumulative sum of officials as the key independent variable 
is because the area of paved roads in each city is a stock variable. The roads that were built in 1993 
will be considered in 1994; the impact that an official has on the area of paved roads is non-
reversible. While the 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙!,! variable increases in both the number of officials and their total 
years in office, I will call 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙!,! cumulative number of official-years from this point forward for 
the sake of simplicity.  
The final sample with which I conduct my analysis for this study includes 3,882 
observations across 15 years and 276 prefecture-level cities. Table 1 describes the list of key 
variables used in this study. Even though all other variables had more than 4,400 observations, 
the variable for the area of paved roads only contains 3,882 observations, and because of this 
reason it reduces the size of my sample down by around 800 observations.  
Figure 1 and 2 in the Appendix show both the growth in the total area of paved roads and 
in total area of paved roads per capita in China between 1993 and 2009, with missing data in 
1995 and 1996. They show that there is a significant amount of roads built during the years of 
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interest to this study. To differentiate the growth by cities that are also hometowns of high-level 
officials as opposed to those that are not, Table 2 in the Appendix shows the tremendous positive 
difference in the growth in roads in cities that are also the birthplaces of high-level officials as 
opposed to otherwise. The statistic that I obtained from testing the significance of that difference 
using a t-test was 14.617. 
 Note: Key variables that are used in this study. The units for each of the variables are as follows: Area 
of land (km2), real GDP (Million RMB), area of paved roads (km2), population (1,000). The official 
dummy variable takes on a 0 when a city has never been an official’s birthplace in the years of 
observation, and 1 when it has had at least one official born in the city. Construction of the cumulative 
# of officials variable is explained on the previous page. 
 
Figure 3 to Figure 6 utilize maps to show the distribution of paved roads and government 
officials across provinces and prefecture-level cities. They provide some visualization for the 
patterns of correlated growth that are described in this paper. Figure 3 shows the distribution of 
paved roads in 2009, while Figure 4 shows per capita paved roads in 2009. Figure 5 shows the 
distribution of the cumulative number of national officials across the country in 2009, while 
Figure 6 shows the number of national officials per capita. The darker regions as shown on the 
maps experience higher density of roads or officials, both in nominal terms and in per capita 
terms. 
VI. Empirical Framework 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (1993-2009) 
       
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Year 3,882 2,002 4.777 1993 2009 
Prefecture-level Cities 3,882 139 80 1 276 
Area of Land  3,882 1,818 2,048 50 20,169 
Real GDP  3,882 31,840 56,667 579 896,805 
Area of Paved Roads  3,882 6.913 9.519 0 122.8 
Population  3,882 1029 882 114 8,014 
Official Dummy 3,882 0.313 0.464 0 1 
Cum. # of Officials 3,882 2.389 5.251 0 36 
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The primary objective for my empirical analysis is to observe whether there is a difference in the 
area of paved roads in China in prefecture-level cities that are also the birthplaces of national-
level officials as opposed to otherwise. I test both the effect of officials and the effect of a one-
unit increase in the cumulative number of official-years by estimating them with the following 
equations: ln 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑢𝑚!,!!! + 𝛾𝛸′!,!!! + 𝑢!+ 𝜃! + 𝜀!"      (f) ln 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙!,!!! + 𝛾𝛸′!,!!! + 𝑢!+ 𝜃! + 𝜀!"      (g) 
where 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠!" is the area of paved roads in each prefectural-level city i at time t, 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑢𝑚!,!!! is a dummy variable that takes on the value 0 when the cumulative number of 
official-years is zero and the value 1 when the cumulative number of official-years is greater 
than zero. 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙!"!! is the cumulative number of official-years city i at time t as I explained in 
the previous section,  𝛸′!"!!, a vector of control variables that includes 1) the log of real GDP, 2) 
the log of the size of population, and 3) the log of the area of the city. 𝑢! and  𝜃! are city-specific 
and time-specific fixed effects, respectively, and 𝜀!" is the error term. I included an s period time 
lag in my model for all independent variables to account for the delay in the time between when 
an official decides to allocate funds for roads construction and when the road has completed 
construction.  
The reason for including the GDP, population size, and city size as my explanatory 
variables is because I expect an increase in each of these three factors to increase the area of 
paved roads in a city. The time-invariant error term 𝑢! denotes prefectural-level fixed effects that 
control for constant prefecture-specific characteristics, such as the geographical location of a 
city. The time-variant error term  𝜃! denotes year fixed-effects that control for the natural trend 
of increase in paved roads that affects all prefectural-level cities. It will also account for 
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exogenous shocks such as policies that have nation-wide consequences. The remaining error 
term 𝜀!" denotes an unobserved effect that varies across time and prefectures. This error term is 
assumed to be independent from any of the explanatory variables and is normally distributed. 
Given the model described above, I expect the coefficient of interest 𝛽! in both equations 
(f) and (g) to be positive, as it will indicate a positive difference between the area of paved roads 
in cities that are the birthplaces of high-level government officials and those that are not, all else 
equals.  The interpretation of a positive 𝛽! is that regional favoritism exists in China. 𝛽! is the 
constant intercept when all independent variables are zero, which is of little importance in the 
context of this model. Robust standard errors are used in this model, where I cluster them at the 
level of prefectures.  
To further disaggregate the effect on paved roads at different levels of officials, I 
deconstruct the 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙!"!! variable into evenly weighted categories and then test the following 
model: ln 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙0!,!!! + 𝛽!𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙1_2!,!!!+𝛽!𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙3_4!,!!! +𝛽!𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙5_9!,!!! + 𝛽!𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙10_36!,!!! + 𝛾𝛸′!,!!! + 𝑢!+ 𝜃! + 𝜀!"                    (h) 
The variable official0 is a category that simply accounts for the cities where no high-level 
official was born. Cities that were the hometowns of at least one high-level official were then 
divided into groups of relatively equal sizes. The variable official1_2 is the category that 
accounts for the cities where one or two high-level official were born, official3_4 for the cities 
where three or four high-level officials were born, official5_9 for cities with five to nine officials 
and official10_36 for cities with ten to thirty-six officials. I expect 𝛽! to be zero, as it will 
indicate that cities that are not also the birthplaces of officials will see no effect on the area of 
paved roads. I expect the remaining 𝛽!,𝛽!,𝛽!, and 𝛽! to be positive, as they will indicate a 
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positive difference between the area of paved roads in cities that are also birthplaces of officials 
compared to otherwise. Given Hypothesis 2, I also expect 𝛽! > 𝛽! > 𝛽! > 𝛽!, which will indicate 
that the impact on area of paved roads increases as the cumulative number of official-years 
increases. 
Potential problems may arise in this model. First, the key independent variable official 
may be endogenous as the total area of paved roads may reflect the competency level of officials 
and thus lead to a higher number of officials found in national office. Fortunately, as the model 
prescribes, a time lag in counting the number of officials in national office can help resolve the 
issue as the area of paved roads in this period cannot retroactively affect the number of officials 
in national office in the last period.  
I determine the effect of each explanatory variable described in Equation 1 on the area of 
paved roads in China from 1993 and 2009 using pooled OLS estimation. I then treat the data as a 
panel dataset and conducted the regressions using fixed effects and random effects to observe the 
differences in the coefficients estimated by each model. The results for different methods are 
reported in Table 4 in the Appendix. The RE and FE models do not reveal many discrepancies in 
the coefficient estimates. Unsurprisingly, the Hausman test fails to reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficient estimates are equal, suggesting that the two estimates are sufficiently close and either 
model could be used in my study. I choose to use the FE model in this study, as it is highly likely 
that the time invariant error term 𝑢! is not independent from my independent explanatory 
variables, thereby yielding more conservative estimates.  
I then tested the fixed effects model with several time lags to determine the appropriate 
amount of time lag to use for this study. Table 5 in the Appendix reports the contemporaneous 
results and results having taken four different time lags. As expected, the impact of officials on 
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the area of paved roads in each city is most significant when I take a one-year lag or a two-year 
lag. The magnitude and significance of coefficients are lower in all other periods. Since the one-
year lag and two-year lag yield similar results, I choose to use a one-year lag as my baseline 
model because lagging the explanatory variables by two years reduces the number of 
observations2.  
VII. Findings and Discussion 
The main results for this study are presented in Table 2. The coefficient of interest in 
Model (1) is positive but not statistically significant. This suggests that the change from having 
no high-level government official who was born in prefecture-level city i to at least one high-
level official who was born in city i does not have a significant impact on the area of paved roads 
in city i. Model (2), however, shows that the area of paved roads increases by 1.5 percent as the 
cumulative number of official-years increases, all else equals.  
While Model (1) and (2)’s results may seem contradictory at first glance, they suggest 
there is a heterogeneity in how the cumulative number of official-years affect the area of paved 
roads. To test this, I break the officials variable down into five different count categories. 
Column (3) in Table 2 reports the results of the regression. The coefficients of interest are the 
ones corresponding to the various categories, with “No Official” omitted as the baseline 
category. The coefficients reported on the categories are compared to the baseline cities where 
no official was born. While the first three categories, “One or Two,” “Three or Four,” and “Five 
to Nine” do not show significant results, the category “Ten to Thirty-Six” produces a coefficient 
that is positive and statistically significant at the 95 percentage confidence level. Compared to 
cities that are not the hometowns of high-level government officials, cities with more than ten 																																																								
2	Table 6 in the Appendix reports the same regression testing different time periods but with per capita measures. 
The key independent variable, “Officials Per Capita,” reports a coefficient that remains strongly significant with a 
one-year lag.  
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cumulative officials on average report a 22.3 percent increase in the area of paved roads, all else 
equals. This seems to suggest that the onset of corruptive practices experience a delay or the 
presence of multiple leaders have colluding effects.  
Table 2: Dynamics of Hometown Favoritism 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log of Area of Roads lgroad lgroad lgroad lgroad lgroad 
      
Official Dummy 0.059     
 (0.049)     
Cum. # of Official-Years (t-1)  0.015***  0.011*** 0.005*** 
  (0.005)  (0.004) (0.002) 
One or Two   0.070   
   (0.043)   
Three or Four   0.031   
   (0.063)   
Five to Nine   0.088   
   (0.067)   
Ten to Thirty-Six   0.223**   
   (0.093)   
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.237** 0.216** 0.228** 0.133** 0.219*** 
 (0.095) (0.093) (0.094) (0.065) (0.053) 
Log of Population (t-1) 0.351*** 0.357*** 0.357*** 0.223** 0.116** 
 (0.091) (0.088) (0.089) (0.097) (0.054) 
Log of Area of City (t-1) -0.083** -0.083** -0.086** -0.053* -0.034** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.030) (0.014) 
Log of Area of Roads (t-1)    0.287** 0.619*** 
    (0.128) (0.103) 
Constant -1.389* -1.224* -1.325* -0.552 -1.743*** 
 (0.752) (0.732) (0.741) (0.518) (0.477) 
      
Observations 3,379 3,379 3,379 3,174 3,174 
R-squared 0.581 0.584 0.583 0.611 0.571 
Number of prefectures 276 276 276 276 276 
Prefecture FE YES YES YES YES NO 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
   
Note: The dependent variable Log of Area of Roads is held at period T. Coefficient corresponding to the 
baseline model. Coefficients corresponding to “One or Two”, “Three or Four”, “Five to Nine”, and “Ten 
to Thirty-Six” are categorical variables that take on a value 1 or 0 based on the value in the “Cum. # of 
Officials” variable. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustering at the prefecture-level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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To better understand which is a more important factor in the increase in the area of paved 
roads, the number of years an official is in office or the number of officials, I analyze the official 
variable in greater detail. The value given by the official variable in the last year of observation, 
2009, gives the total number of years in which a city has had high-level officials in office. I 
create a separate variable that counts the total number of officials in office in each city from 
1993 to 2009. I then regress the two variables, one that accounts for the total number of years in 
office the other that accounts of the total number of officials, on the total area of paved roads in 
each city. Taking the long difference in each variable between 1993 and 2009 essentially reduces 
the panel into a cross-sectional dataset, so I conducted my analysis using the OLS multiple 
regression method. The results are reported in Table 7 in the Appendix and they suggest that 
both the number of years a high-level official is in office and the number of high-level officials 
contribute to the positive difference in the area of paved roads. The effect on paved roads is 
greater as both the number of years increases and the number of high-level officials increases. 
How many years after a high-level official is in office will his or her hometown observe 
an increased area of paved roads? To explore this question, I tested several lags on the dummy 
variable that indicates when one or more officials from city i are currently in office in time t. The 
results are reported in Table 8, where all indicators for the periods that I tested were insignificant 
except for the indicator during time t-5. This can be interpreted as the presence of one or more 
high-level official five years ago has a significant positive impact on the amount of paved roads 
in his or her hometown today. This finding is consistent with Hodler and Raschky’s study where 
they found that political leaders “take a few years before they successfully engage in regional 
favoritism, and then become increasingly better at supporting their birth region (2014, 1025).”  
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I strengthen the robustness of my findings by taking the lag of the dependent variable, log 
of area of roads, as an independent variable on the right hand side in order to reduce the 
existence of autocorrelation in my baseline model. The results are reported in Column (4) in 
Table 2. While “Log of Area of Roads” in time t-1 is positive and statistically significant, the 
coefficient for “Cum. # of Officials” also remained positive and statistically significant, though it 
dropped down from the original baseline model estimate of 0.015 to 0.009. As Hodler and 
Raschky (2014) did in addressing the Nickell (1981) bias in their study, I follow Angrist and 
Pishke (2009)’s recommended method of estimating a specification with fixed effects (but no 
lagged dependent variable) and one with the lagged dependent variable (but no fixed effects). 
The true effect should lie between the estimates of the two specifications (Hodler & Raschky 
2014, 1011). Column 5 in Table 2 reports the results of the specification that estimates the lagged 
dependent variable (but does not include fixed effects). The coefficient estimate has decreased in 
magnitude but remains positive and significant. This suggests that the true effect of a unit 
increase in cumulative number of official-years on the area of paved roads lies in the positive 
range and is statistically significant. 
Last but not least, I investigate the change in favoritism behaviors over the years of 
observation. The results correspond well with the timing of policy reforms in China. Table 9 
shows the cross-sectional regressions from 1993 to 2003 while Table 10 shows the cross-
sectional regressions from 2004 to 2009. These two periods are significant as the first major 
policy reform in public investment management occurred in 2004, when the Chinese government 
decided to simplify approval procedures for public investment projects, thereby reducing the 
level of oversight of infrastructure projects. None but one of the coefficient estimates for the key 
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official variable is significant from 1993 to 2003, and all but one of the coefficient estimates 
become significant beginning in 2004 when the reforms took effect.  
The sudden change in the impact of high-level officials on roads construction may be 
because engaging in corruptive behaviors in the form of regional favoritism had become easier 
and less costly. Infrastructure projects no longer needed to undergo long process of approvals 
from the Central government – they can now be decided on the end of local officials. As a result 
of greater autonomy, corruption grows rampant. The findings for yearly cross-sectional analysis 
support the theoretical framework laid out in the previous sections. When local officials are 
given greater amount of autonomy, the results show that they build more roads in the birthplaces 
of high-level officials. The results support this paper’s argument that local officials build more 
roads in the hometowns of national-level officials in order to obtain favor from their superiors 
and increase their chances of promotion. 
VIII. Conclusion 
 Where do the roads go in China? This study has shown that on average, more roads are 
built in cities that are the hometowns of high-level officials, suggesting corruption in the form of 
regional favoritism. While the national-level officials themselves may not have direct budgetary 
powers to control where roads are built, the top-down selection of government officials create 
incentives for lower-level officials to build roads in the hometowns of their superiors in order to 
increase their chances of promotion. I demonstrate empirically the positive difference in the area 
of roads in cities that are also birthplaces of national-level officials by using a panel on Chinese 
prefecture-level cities from 1993 to 2009. The findings are subjected an interesting nuance: not 
only does it take time before officials engage in regional favoritism, the effect increases as the 
number of high-level officials increase.  
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 This paper also shows that the 2004 reform in public investment management 
exacerbated the impact high-levels officials could have on roads construction. It created 
incentives for officials to engage in corruptive behaviors by reducing oversight and hence, the 
risk of getting caught. Thus, while decentralization of the fiscal process is evidence of a more 
efficient government, the tradeoff is the economic efficiency that was given up as a result of 
corruptive behaviors. Creating new policies to increase oversight and not bureaucracy is much 
needed if China were to strive for an efficient government.    
While the focus of this study is China, the same empirical results would likely be present 
in other autocratic countries and in other forms of public investments, such as electricity 
coverage, Internet coverage, and water infrastructure. Corruption can sometimes be not at all 
obvious when it relies on channels of informal influences and social networks, and regional 
favoritism, as a form of corruption, may not necessarily yield negative results. Thus, a greater 
body of research should be dedicated to uncovering these disguised forms of corruption in order 
to gain a better understanding of the problem. While the findings of this study reveal the effect of 
high-level officials on roads construction, they do not show if the allocation of roads to officials’ 
hometowns is truly inefficient. This is a topic that requires further research as it will help 
elucidate the true costs of corruption to the greater economy.  
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Appendix 
Table 3: Change in area of paved roads in prefecture-level cities in China 
   
 
 Presence of Officials 
1993 2009 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
City has no official 221 2.363 2.727 162 7.961 8.867 
One or more officials 40 3.286 3.520 113 16.215 17.133 
Total 261 2.505 2.974 275 11.353 13.518 
       
Note: Obs. increases from 1993 to 2009 because the data did not contain information for some cities in 
earlier years. The table shows the descriptive statistics of the log of area of paved roads in China in 1993 
and 2009, respectively, differentiating between cities where no officials were ever born and cities where 
at least one or more officials were born.  
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Table 4: Different Methods of Analysis 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log of Area of Roads (t)  OLS RE FE 
    
Cum. # of Official-Years (t-1) 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) 
Log of real GDP (t-1) 0.595*** 0.482*** 0.216** 
 (0.025) (0.056) (0.093) 
Log of population (t-1) 0.283*** 0.360*** 0.357*** 
 (0.038) (0.074) (0.088) 
Log of area (t-1) -0.069*** -0.128*** -0.083** 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.035) 
Constant -5.186*** -3.681*** -1.224* 
 (0.143) (0.397) (0.732) 
    
Observations 3,379 3,379 3,379 
R-squared 0.727  0.584 
Prefecture FE NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Number of Prefectures  276 276 
     
Note: I test my data with different models, namely pooled OLS regression in Column 1, the 
random effects model in Column 2, and the fixed effects model in Column 3. The dependent 
variable Log of Area of Roads is held at period T. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
clustering at the prefecture-level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5: Fixed Effect Model Testing Multiple Lags 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log of Area of Roads t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 
      
Cum. # of Official-Years 0.012** 0.015*** 0.015** 0.014** 0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log of GDP  0.290*** 0.216*** 0.095 0.096** 0.204** 
 (0.076) (0.093) (0.114) (0.131) (0.082) 
Log of Population  0.364*** 0.357*** 0.264** 0.154 0.032 
 (0.094) (0.088) (0.114) (0.133) (0.109) 
Log of City Area -0.075** -0.083** -0.049 -0.025 -0.010 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.047) (0.042) (0.041) 
Constant -3.061*** -1.224** 0.216 0.565 -0.046 
 (0.493) (0.732) (0.861) (0.993) (0.669) 
Observations 3,700 3,379 3,123 3,079 3,060 
R-squared 0.631 0.584 0.526 0.524 0.637 
Number of Prefectures 276 276 276 276 276 
Prefecture FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Note: Independent variables are tested with different amounts of lags as indicated at the top of each 
column. The dependent variable Log of Area of Roads is held at period T. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustering at the prefecture-level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Fixed Effect Model for Per Capita Measures with Multiple Lags 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Roads Per Capita t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 
      
Officials Per Capita 0.1176*** 0.1665*** 0.1871** 0.1993** 0.2435* 
 (0.036) (0.060) (0.078) (0.090) (0.135) 
GDP Per Capita 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population Density 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.0014*** 0.0045*** 0.0053*** 0.0057*** 0.0062*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Observations 3,700 3,378 3,122 3,078 3,059 
R-squared 0.105 0.080 0.063 0.061 0.061 
Number of Prefectures 276 276 276 276 276 
Prefecture FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Note: Independent variables are tested with different amounts of lags as indicated at the top of each 
column. The dependent variable Roads per Capita is held at period T. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustering at the prefecture-level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Long Difference Regression from 1993 to 2009 
   
 (1) (2) 
Δ Area of Paved Roads Number of Years Number of Officials 
  
Officials’ Years in Office  
One to Five 1.1539  
 (0.914)  
Six to Ten 2.4940  
 (1.647)  
Eleven to Thirty-Six 2.9533*  
 (1.629)  
Total Number of Officials  
One   1.9190* 
  (1.078) 
Two to Eight  2.3851* 
  (1.354) 
Δ Real GDP 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Population 0.0025 0.0025 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Δ Land Area  -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 2.0150*** 1.9871*** 
 (0.473) (0.474) 
   
Observations 276 276 
R-squared 0.755 0.757 
   
Note: Column (1) examines the total number of years a city has had an official in office from 
1993 to 2009. Column (2) examines the total number of officials from each city who took office 
from 1993 to 2009. Categories for both the Years in Office variable and the Total Number of 
Officials variable are created as groups of relatively equal sizes.	Δ Real GDP, Δ Land Area, and 
Δ Population are the net changes in those variables from 1993 to 2009. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Lagged Indicator for One or More Officials in Office 
           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Log of Area of Roads (t) t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 t-9 t-10 
           
Officials in Office 0.029 0.028 0.037 0.061 0.107** 0.032 0.026 -0.037 0.028 0.029 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) (0.038) (0.048) (0.076) (0.092) (0.092) (0.035) (0.030) 
Log of GDP (t-1) 0.239** 0.163 0.162 0.160 0.135 0.117 0.056 0.022 0.159 0.125 
 (0.095) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.120) (0.126) (0.156) (0.195) (0.118) (0.109) 
Log of Population (t-1) 0.356*** 0.405*** 0.406*** 0.410*** 0.373*** 0.354*** 0.356*** 0.302** 0.100 0.128 
 (0.091) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.106) (0.108) (0.115) (0.129) (0.099) (0.102) 
Log of Area of City (t-1) -0.084** -0.095** -0.095** -0.097** -0.082** -0.083** -0.087** -0.093** -0.086** -0.077* 
 (0.036) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) 
Constant -1.400* -0.767 -0.756 -0.753 -0.452 -0.164 0.485 1.125 0.563 0.715 
 (0.751) (0.865) (0.863) (0.866) (0.928) (0.976) (1.212) (1.545) (0.996) (0.912) 
           
Observations 3,379 3,171 3,171 3,169 2,962 2,757 2,548 2,326 2,085 1,833 
R-squared 0.581 0.529 0.529 0.530 0.500 0.452 0.397 0.342 0.416 0.340 
Number of Prefectures 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 
Prefecture FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
           
Note: All independent variables except for Officials in Office are held at period t-1. Officials in Office is the only variable that changes in its time 
dimension, and it is tested as different amounts of lags as indicated at the top of each column. The dependent variable Log of Area of Roads is 
held at period t. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustering at the prefecture-level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Cross Section Regression in Individual Years (1994-2003) 
        
Log of Area of 
Roads (t) 
(1) 
1994 
(2) 
1998 
(3) 
1999 
(4) 
2000 
(5) 
2001 
(6) 
2002 
(7) 
2003 
        
Cum. Official-Years  
(t-1) 
-0.001 
(0.051) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
Log of GDP  
(t-1) 
0.700*** 
(0.063) 
0.743*** 
(0.082) 
0.591*** 
(0.067) 
0.591*** 
(0.088) 
0.401 
(0.054) 
0.619*** 
(0.052) 
0.571*** 
(0.052) 
Log of Population 
(t-1) 
0.119 
(0.083) 
0.011 
(0.092) 
0.056 
(0.098) 
0.170** 
(0.080) 
0.669 
(0.464) 
0.316*** 
(0.076) 
0.329*** 
(0.076) 
Log of City Area  
(t-1) 
0.001 
(0.032) 
0.044 
(0.036) 
-0.014 
(0.028) 
-0.039 
(0.038) 
-0.193* 
(0.112) 
-0.125*** 
(0.038) 
-0.103*** 
(0.032) 
Constant -6.004*** -6.148*** -5.489*** -4.815*** -4.084*** -4.944*** -4.648*** 
 (0.447) (0.647) (0.386) (0.749) (1.273) (0.331) (0.363) 
Observations 208 204 205 220 239 248 255 
R-squared 0.661 0.622 0.733 0.601 0.694 0.747 0.747 
        
Note: Independent variables are in the years as indicated at the top of each column. The dependent variable Log 
of Area of Roads is held at period t. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustering at the prefecture-level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 10: Cross Section Regression in Individual Years (2004-2009) 
       
Log of Area of 
Roads (t) 
(1) 
2004 
(2) 
2005 
(3) 
2006 
(4) 
2007 
(5) 
2008 
(6) 
2009 
       
Cum. Official-Years  
(t-1) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.010** 
(0.003) 
Log of GDP  0.561*** 0.580*** 0.577*** 0.636*** 0.561*** 0.531*** 
(t-1) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.082) (0.049) (0.056) 
Log of Population 
(t-1) 
0.335*** 
(0.071) 
0.338*** 
(0.068) 
0.316*** 
(0.069) 
0.284*** 
(0.090) 
0.323*** 
(0.071) 
0.411*** 
(0.089) 
Log of City Area  
(t-1) 
-0.081*** 
(0.029) 
-0.059** 
(0.026) 
-0.065** 
(0.031) 
-0.110*** 
(0.038) 
-0.075*** 
(0.028) 
-0.111*** 
(0.033) 
Constant -4.729*** -5.068*** -4.889*** -4.971*** -4.658*** -4.527*** 
 (0.356) (0.323) (0.316) (0.424) (0.322) (0.351) 
Observations 267 271 266 263 267 263 
R-squared 0.771 0.817 0.784 0.736 0.796 0.768 
       
Note: Independent variables are in the years as indicated at the top of each column. The dependent variable Log 
of Area of Roads is held at period t. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustering at the prefecture-level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
